Will the Federal Reserve’s September meeting see USinterest rates go up for the first time since 2006?Officials have held out the prospect that it might, and have suggested that — barring majorunforeseen developments — rates will probably be increased by the end of the year. Conditionscould change, and the Fed has been careful to avoid outright commitments. But a reasonableassessment of current conditions suggest that raising rates in the near future would be aserious error that would threaten all three of the Fed’s major objectives — price stability, fullemployment and financial stability.

在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)今年9月的會(huì)議上，我們將看到美國(guó)利率自2006年以來(lái)的第一次上升嗎?官員們堅(jiān)稱(chēng)這種可能性是存在的，并暗示，除非發(fā)生重大的不可預(yù)知事件，否則今年年底前很可能加息。狀況可能變化，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)一直小心翼翼地避免做出直截了當(dāng)?shù)某兄Z。但對(duì)當(dāng)前狀況作出的合理評(píng)估似乎表明，在最近的將來(lái)加息將是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的錯(cuò)誤，它將危及美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的所有三大目標(biāo)：物價(jià)穩(wěn)定、充分就業(yè)和金融穩(wěn)定。

Like most major central banks, the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice byadopting a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this— a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy. More than half the components of theconsumer price index have declined in the past six months — the first time this has happenedin more than a decade. CPI inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices anddifficult-to-measure housing, is less than 1 per cent. Market-based measures of expectationssuggest that, over the next 10 years, inflation will be well under 2 per cent. If the currencies ofChina and other emerging markets depreciate further, US inflation will be even moresubdued.

像大多數(shù)主要央行一樣，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為了實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)，把通脹率目標(biāo)定為2%。目前最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是通脹率將低于這一水平，收緊貨幣政策將會(huì)加劇此風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。過(guò)去6個(gè)月里，消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)中的逾半數(shù)成分都有所下跌，這是10多年來(lái)首次出現(xiàn)這種情況。剔除能源、食品和難以衡量的住房的CPI目前低于1%。基于市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期指標(biāo)顯示，未來(lái)10年，通脹率將遠(yuǎn)低于2%。如果中國(guó)等新興市場(chǎng)的貨幣進(jìn)一步貶值，美國(guó)的通脹將更加低迷。

Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels because higher interest rates makeholding on to cash more attractive than investing it. Higher interest rates will also increase thevalue of the dollar, making US producers less competitive and pressuring the economies of ourtrading partners.

收緊貨幣政策將對(duì)就業(yè)水平構(gòu)成負(fù)面影響，因?yàn)槔噬邥?huì)讓保留現(xiàn)金比投資現(xiàn)金更有吸引力。利率升高也將推高美元匯率，降低美國(guó)生產(chǎn)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，也給我國(guó)貿(mào)易伙伴的經(jīng)濟(jì)體帶來(lái)壓力。

This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality. Studies of periods of tight labourmarkets like the late 1990s and 1960s make it clear that the best social programme fordisadvantaged workers is an economy where employers are struggling to fill vacancies.

這在不平等程度上升之際尤其麻煩。對(duì)1990年代末和1960年代等勞動(dòng)力緊張時(shí)期的研究表明，對(duì)弱勢(shì)工人而言，最好的社會(huì)方案是打造雇主競(jìng)相填補(bǔ)崗位空缺的經(jīng)濟(jì)。

There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago, as lowinterest rates were encouraging investors to take more risks and businesses to borrow moneyand engage in financial engineering. At the time, I believed that the economic costs of a rateincrease exceeded the financial stability benefits, but there were grounds for concern. Thatdebate is now moot. With credit becoming more expensive, the outlook for the Chineseeconomy clouded at best, emerging markets submerging, the US stock market in acorrection, widespread concerns about liquidity, and expected volatility having increased ata near-record rate, markets are themselves dampening any euphoria or overconfidence. TheFed does not have to do the job. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping somepart of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.

若是在6個(gè)月或9個(gè)月之前加息，或許還能祭出金融穩(wěn)定方面的理由，因?yàn)槟菚r(shí)低利率正鼓勵(lì)投資者承擔(dān)更多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)借入更多資金從事金融工程。當(dāng)時(shí)，我認(rèn)為加息的經(jīng)濟(jì)代價(jià)大于維持金融穩(wěn)定方面的收益，但各方有理由感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)。現(xiàn)在這場(chǎng)辯論已無(wú)關(guān)緊要了。隨著信貸變得更昂貴，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景即使往好了說(shuō)也是烏云密布，新興市場(chǎng)正在沉沒(méi)，美國(guó)股市陷入回調(diào)，市場(chǎng)普遍擔(dān)憂(yōu)流動(dòng)性，以及預(yù)期波動(dòng)率以接近創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的速度加大，市場(chǎng)本身正在抑制狂熱氛圍或者過(guò)度樂(lè)觀(guān)情緒。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不需要出手。在當(dāng)下市場(chǎng)脆弱之時(shí)加息，可能會(huì)把金融體系的某些部分推入危機(jī)，帶來(lái)難以預(yù)料的危險(xiǎn)后果。

Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates werenow 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from asense that the economy has substantially normalised during six years of recovery, and so theextraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn. There has been much talkof “headwinds that require low interest rates now but this will abate before long, allowing fornormal growth and normal interest rates.

那么，為什么有這么多人認(rèn)為有必要加息呢?如果目前利率為4%，加息壓力還會(huì)很大嗎?我對(duì)此表示懷疑。壓力來(lái)自一種觀(guān)點(diǎn)，即美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)過(guò)6年的復(fù)蘇已基本正常化，因此異常的零利率刺激應(yīng)該退場(chǎng)了。很多人在說(shuō)，眼下有一些“逆風(fēng)需要低利率，但惡劣天氣很快會(huì)過(guò)去，為正常增長(zhǎng)和正常利率創(chuàng)造條件。

Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach theseventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think ofeconomic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds. Fiscal drag is over.Banks are well capitalised. Corporations are flush with cash. Household balance sheets aresubstantially repaired.

無(wú)論這一觀(guān)點(diǎn)在幾年前有什么道理，在我們就要迎來(lái)雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒閉七周年之際，它的可信度已遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不如當(dāng)初。現(xiàn)在，我們不再能夠輕易把經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況可信地視為暫時(shí)的“逆風(fēng)。財(cái)政拖累結(jié)束了。銀行的資本充足了。企業(yè)坐擁大量現(xiàn)金。家庭資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表基本上已修復(fù)。

Much more plausible is the view that, for reasons rooted in technological and demographicchange and reinforced by greater regulation of the financial sector, the global economy hasdifficulty generating demand for all that can be produced. This is the “secular stagnationdiagnosis, or the very similar idea that Ben Bernanke, former Fed chairman, has urged of a“savings glut. Satisfactory growth, if it can be achieved, requires very low interest rates thathistorically we have only seen during economic crises. This is why long term bond markets aretelling us that real interest rates are expected to be close to zero in the industrialised worldover the next decade.

可信得多的觀(guān)點(diǎn)是，出于一些源自技術(shù)與人口結(jié)構(gòu)變化、而且被金融行業(yè)更嚴(yán)厲監(jiān)管強(qiáng)化的原因，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)無(wú)法為所有可以生產(chǎn)出來(lái)的產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)造出需求。這是一種“長(zhǎng)期停滯的診斷，非常類(lèi)似于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席本伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在呼吁消除“儲(chǔ)蓄過(guò)剩時(shí)提出的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。令人滿(mǎn)意的增長(zhǎng)——如果可以實(shí)現(xiàn)的話(huà)——需要實(shí)行歷史上僅僅在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)期間看到的極低利率。這就是為什么長(zhǎng)期債券市場(chǎng)告訴我們，預(yù)計(jì)未來(lái)10年里工業(yè)化國(guó)家的實(shí)際利率會(huì)接近于零。

New conditions require new policies. There is much that should be done, such as steps topromote public and private investment so as to raise the level of real interest rates consistentwith full employment. Unless these new policies are implemented, inflation sharply accelerates,or euphoria in markets breaks out, there is no case for the Fed to adjust policy interest rates.

新的狀況要求新的政策。目前應(yīng)當(dāng)采取很多措施，比如促進(jìn)公共和私人部門(mén)的投資，以提升實(shí)際利率，使其達(dá)到與充分就業(yè)相稱(chēng)的水平。除非實(shí)施了這些新政策，除非通脹大幅加速上升，或者市場(chǎng)狂熱爆發(fā)，否則美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)就沒(méi)有理由調(diào)整政策利率。

The writer is the Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasurysecretary

本文作者是哈佛大學(xué)查爾斯圠縠斂祵大學(xué)教授(Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard)，曾任美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)

Will the Federal Reserve’s September meeting see USinterest rates go up for the first time since 2006?Officials have held out the prospect that it might, and have suggested that — barring majorunforeseen developments — rates will probably be increased by the end of the year. Conditionscould change, and the Fed has been careful to avoid outright commitments. But a reasonableassessment of current conditions suggest that raising rates in the near future would be aserious error that would threaten all three of the Fed’s major objectives — price stability, fullemployment and financial stability.

在美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)今年9月的會(huì)議上，我們將看到美國(guó)利率自2006年以來(lái)的第一次上升嗎?官員們堅(jiān)稱(chēng)這種可能性是存在的，并暗示，除非發(fā)生重大的不可預(yù)知事件，否則今年年底前很可能加息。狀況可能變化，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)(Fed)一直小心翼翼地避免做出直截了當(dāng)?shù)某兄Z。但對(duì)當(dāng)前狀況作出的合理評(píng)估似乎表明，在最近的將來(lái)加息將是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的錯(cuò)誤，它將危及美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)的所有三大目標(biāo)：物價(jià)穩(wěn)定、充分就業(yè)和金融穩(wěn)定。

Like most major central banks, the Fed has put its price stability objective into practice byadopting a 2 per cent inflation target. The biggest risk is that inflation will be lower than this— a risk that would be exacerbated by tightening policy. More than half the components of theconsumer price index have declined in the past six months — the first time this has happenedin more than a decade. CPI inflation, which excludes volatile energy and food prices anddifficult-to-measure housing, is less than 1 per cent. Market-based measures of expectationssuggest that, over the next 10 years, inflation will be well under 2 per cent. If the currencies ofChina and other emerging markets depreciate further, US inflation will be even moresubdued.

像大多數(shù)主要央行一樣，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)為了實(shí)現(xiàn)價(jià)格穩(wěn)定目標(biāo)，把通脹率目標(biāo)定為2%。目前最大的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就是通脹率將低于這一水平，收緊貨幣政策將會(huì)加劇此風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。過(guò)去6個(gè)月里，消費(fèi)價(jià)格指數(shù)(CPI)中的逾半數(shù)成分都有所下跌，這是10多年來(lái)首次出現(xiàn)這種情況。剔除能源、食品和難以衡量的住房的CPI目前低于1%。基于市場(chǎng)的預(yù)期指標(biāo)顯示，未來(lái)10年，通脹率將遠(yuǎn)低于2%。如果中國(guó)等新興市場(chǎng)的貨幣進(jìn)一步貶值，美國(guó)的通脹將更加低迷。

Tightening policy will adversely affect employment levels because higher interest rates makeholding on to cash more attractive than investing it. Higher interest rates will also increase thevalue of the dollar, making US producers less competitive and pressuring the economies of ourtrading partners.

收緊貨幣政策將對(duì)就業(yè)水平構(gòu)成負(fù)面影響，因?yàn)槔噬邥?huì)讓保留現(xiàn)金比投資現(xiàn)金更有吸引力。利率升高也將推高美元匯率，降低美國(guó)生產(chǎn)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，也給我國(guó)貿(mào)易伙伴的經(jīng)濟(jì)體帶來(lái)壓力。

This is especially troubling at a time of rising inequality. Studies of periods of tight labourmarkets like the late 1990s and 1960s make it clear that the best social programme fordisadvantaged workers is an economy where employers are struggling to fill vacancies.

這在不平等程度上升之際尤其麻煩。對(duì)1990年代末和1960年代等勞動(dòng)力緊張時(shí)期的研究表明，對(duì)弱勢(shì)工人而言，最好的社會(huì)方案是打造雇主競(jìng)相填補(bǔ)崗位空缺的經(jīng)濟(jì)。

There may have been a financial stability case for raising rates six or nine months ago, as lowinterest rates were encouraging investors to take more risks and businesses to borrow moneyand engage in financial engineering. At the time, I believed that the economic costs of a rateincrease exceeded the financial stability benefits, but there were grounds for concern. Thatdebate is now moot. With credit becoming more expensive, the outlook for the Chineseeconomy clouded at best, emerging markets submerging, the US stock market in acorrection, widespread concerns about liquidity, and expected volatility having increased ata near-record rate, markets are themselves dampening any euphoria or overconfidence. TheFed does not have to do the job. At this moment of fragility, raising rates risks tipping somepart of the financial system into crisis, with unpredictable and dangerous results.

若是在6個(gè)月或9個(gè)月之前加息，或許還能祭出金融穩(wěn)定方面的理由，因?yàn)槟菚r(shí)低利率正鼓勵(lì)投資者承擔(dān)更多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)借入更多資金從事金融工程。當(dāng)時(shí)，我認(rèn)為加息的經(jīng)濟(jì)代價(jià)大于維持金融穩(wěn)定方面的收益，但各方有理由感到擔(dān)憂(yōu)。現(xiàn)在這場(chǎng)辯論已無(wú)關(guān)緊要了。隨著信貸變得更昂貴，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)前景即使往好了說(shuō)也是烏云密布，新興市場(chǎng)正在沉沒(méi)，美國(guó)股市陷入回調(diào)，市場(chǎng)普遍擔(dān)憂(yōu)流動(dòng)性，以及預(yù)期波動(dòng)率以接近創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的速度加大，市場(chǎng)本身正在抑制狂熱氛圍或者過(guò)度樂(lè)觀(guān)情緒。美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)不需要出手。在當(dāng)下市場(chǎng)脆弱之時(shí)加息，可能會(huì)把金融體系的某些部分推入危機(jī)，帶來(lái)難以預(yù)料的危險(xiǎn)后果。

Why, then, do so many believe that a rate increase is necessary? I doubt that, if rates werenow 4 per cent, there would be much pressure to raise them. That pressure comes from asense that the economy has substantially normalised during six years of recovery, and so theextraordinary stimulus of zero interest rates should be withdrawn. There has been much talkof “headwinds that require low interest rates now but this will abate before long, allowing fornormal growth and normal interest rates.

那么，為什么有這么多人認(rèn)為有必要加息呢?如果目前利率為4%，加息壓力還會(huì)很大嗎?我對(duì)此表示懷疑。壓力來(lái)自一種觀(guān)點(diǎn)，即美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)過(guò)6年的復(fù)蘇已基本正常化，因此異常的零利率刺激應(yīng)該退場(chǎng)了。很多人在說(shuō)，眼下有一些“逆風(fēng)需要低利率，但惡劣天氣很快會(huì)過(guò)去，為正常增長(zhǎng)和正常利率創(chuàng)造條件。

Whatever merit this view had a few years ago, it is much less plausible as we approach theseventh anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. It is no longer easy to think ofeconomic conditions that can plausibly be seen as temporary headwinds. Fiscal drag is over.Banks are well capitalised. Corporations are flush with cash. Household balance sheets aresubstantially repaired.

無(wú)論這一觀(guān)點(diǎn)在幾年前有什么道理，在我們就要迎來(lái)雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)倒閉七周年之際，它的可信度已遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不如當(dāng)初。現(xiàn)在，我們不再能夠輕易把經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況可信地視為暫時(shí)的“逆風(fēng)。財(cái)政拖累結(jié)束了。銀行的資本充足了。企業(yè)坐擁大量現(xiàn)金。家庭資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表基本上已修復(fù)。

Much more plausible is the view that, for reasons rooted in technological and demographicchange and reinforced by greater regulation of the financial sector, the global economy hasdifficulty generating demand for all that can be produced. This is the “secular stagnationdiagnosis, or the very similar idea that Ben Bernanke, former Fed chairman, has urged of a“savings glut. Satisfactory growth, if it can be achieved, requires very low interest rates thathistorically we have only seen during economic crises. This is why long term bond markets aretelling us that real interest rates are expected to be close to zero in the industrialised worldover the next decade.

可信得多的觀(guān)點(diǎn)是，出于一些源自技術(shù)與人口結(jié)構(gòu)變化、而且被金融行業(yè)更嚴(yán)厲監(jiān)管強(qiáng)化的原因，全球經(jīng)濟(jì)無(wú)法為所有可以生產(chǎn)出來(lái)的產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)造出需求。這是一種“長(zhǎng)期停滯的診斷，非常類(lèi)似于美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席本伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在呼吁消除“儲(chǔ)蓄過(guò)剩時(shí)提出的觀(guān)點(diǎn)。令人滿(mǎn)意的增長(zhǎng)——如果可以實(shí)現(xiàn)的話(huà)——需要實(shí)行歷史上僅僅在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)期間看到的極低利率。這就是為什么長(zhǎng)期債券市場(chǎng)告訴我們，預(yù)計(jì)未來(lái)10年里工業(yè)化國(guó)家的實(shí)際利率會(huì)接近于零。

New conditions require new policies. There is much that should be done, such as steps topromote public and private investment so as to raise the level of real interest rates consistentwith full employment. Unless these new policies are implemented, inflation sharply accelerates,or euphoria in markets breaks out, there is no case for the Fed to adjust policy interest rates.

新的狀況要求新的政策。目前應(yīng)當(dāng)采取很多措施，比如促進(jìn)公共和私人部門(mén)的投資，以提升實(shí)際利率，使其達(dá)到與充分就業(yè)相稱(chēng)的水平。除非實(shí)施了這些新政策，除非通脹大幅加速上升，或者市場(chǎng)狂熱爆發(fā)，否則美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)就沒(méi)有理由調(diào)整政策利率。

The writer is the Charles W Eliot university professor at Harvard and a former US Treasurysecretary

本文作者是哈佛大學(xué)查爾斯圠縠斂祵大學(xué)教授(Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard)，曾任美國(guó)財(cái)政部長(zhǎng)